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Normativity, Fairness, and the Problem
of Factual Uncertainty
ANDREW BOTTERELL* & CHRISTOPHER ESSERT**
This article concerns the problem of factual uncertainty in negligence law. We argue that
negligence taw's insistence that fair terms of interaction be maintained between individualsa requirement that typically manifests itself in the need for the plaintiff to prove factual or
"but-for" causation-sometimes allows for the imposition of liability in the absence of such
proof. In particular, we argue that the but-for requirement can be abandoned in certain
situations where multiple defendants have imposed the same unreasonable risk on a plaintiff, where the plaintiff suffers the very sort of harm that rendered the risk unreasonable,
and where the plaintiff cannot prove which of the defendants was the but-for cause of her
loss. This approach provides one way to understand the Supreme Court of Canada's recent
decision in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke. We find support for our approach in various concepts
that underlie negligence liability quite generally. These underlying concepts are normative
in nature, and manifest core notions of justice and fairness. We argue that approaches to
the problem of factual uncertainty that appeal to such normative principles to make sense
of atypical cases of causation are in no way inconsistent with the nature and structure of
negligence law. Rather, the opposite is true: in taking negligence law seriously as law, such
approaches are instead reflective and supportive of it.
Le present article porte sur le probl~me de ['incertitude de fait en droit de [a n6gligence.
Nous faisons valoir que l'insistance du droit de [a n6gligence sur le fait que des modalit6s
6quitables d'interaction doivent 6tre maintenues entre les personnes, exigence qui se manifeste habituellement dans le besoin pour le/la demandeur/demanderesse de prouver Ia
causalit6 de fait ou ['absence de lien de causalit6, permet parfois d'imposer une responsabilit6 en ['absence de cette preuve. Nous soutenons en particulier que labsence d'exigence
peut 6tre abandonn6e dans certains cas lorsque ptusieurs d6fendeurs ont impos6 le m~me
risque d6raisonnable au/6 La demandeur/demanderesse, lorsque celui-ci ou ceLle-ci subit
exactement le genre de pr6judice qui a rendu le risque d6raisonnable et qu'it ou qu'elle ne
peut prouver celui des d6fendeurs qui a 6t6 [a cause d6terminante de sa perte. Ce point de
vue fournit un moyen de comprendre la decision r6cente que [a Cour supreme du Canada a
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rendue dans Lacause Resurfice Corp. c. Hanke. Nous fondons notre point de vue sur divers
concepts qui sous-tendent de facon tr(s g6n~rate taresponsabitit6 en mati~re de n~gtigence.
Ces concepts sous-jacents sont de nature normative et manifestent des notions fondamentales en mati~re de justice et d'6quit. Nous faisons vatoir que tes facons d'aborder Le
probtme de L'incertitude, probLtme qui utitise de tets principes normatifs dans te but de
trouver un sens des cas atypiques de iens de causaLit6 ne sont aucunement incompatibtes
avec Lanature et Lastructure du droit de La n6gtigence. Bien au contraire, en prenant le
droit de Lan6gtigence au s~rieux comme toi, de pareiLs points de vue ont plutat pour effet
de refL6ter ce droit et de 'appuyer.
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IT IS UNCONTROVERSIAL THAT FACTUAL CAUSATION-not to be confused with
legal or "proximate" causation-plays a central role in typical negligence cases.
In such cases, a defendant is liable for a plaintiffs injuries only if those injuries
were in fact caused by the defendant's careless action.' As it is sometimes put,
"[t]he standard rule is that it is not enough to show that the defendant's conduct increased the likelihood of damage being suffered.... It must be proved on
a balance of probability that the defendant's conduct did cause the damage in
the sense that it would not otherwise have happened."2 This counterfactual test
has become known as the "but-for" test for factual causation: a defendant is said
to have caused a plaintiffs injury if that injury would not have occurred but for
the defendant's negligence. In linking the defendant's careless action to the
plaintiffs injury, the requirement of factual causation "attest[s] to the dependence of the plaintiff's claim on a wrong suffered at the defendant's hand"' and

1. See e.g. Barnett v. Chelsea & Kensington HospitalManagement Committee, [1968] 1 All E.R.
1068 (Q.B.D.).
2.

Barker v. Corus UKLtd., [2006] 2 A.C. 572 at 579, Hoffman L.J. (H.L.) [Barker].

3.

Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea ofPrivate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 2.
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forms a core part of the reasons for which liability should be imposed on a defendant in a given case.'
It is also uncontroversial that certain situations create problems for the butfor test. These are situations where considerations of justice and fairness incline
us towards the view that liability should not be negated simply because factual
causation cannot be established. We will call these atypical cases. For example,
suppose A and B each shoot carelessly in the direction of C, and suppose that
while C is injured by one of the shots, it is not possible to determine which shot
in fact caused C's injury. This presents an obvious evidential problem, since C
cannot say which of A or B in fact injured him. Nonetheless, it is very plausible
to suppose that C's suit in negligence should not be dismissed simply because
but-for causation cannot be established on the balance of probabilities.
But this surface plausibility masks an underlying puzzle: why shouldn't liability be negated in such a case? Therefore, the problem of factual uncertainty in one
of its guises is this: what distinguishes typical cases, in which proof of factual
causation is required, from atypical cases, in which the requirement of factual
causation is waived? That is, what justifies dispensing with the requirement of
factual causation in some cases, but not in others?
In this article, we sketch a general approach to resolving the puzzle that gives
rise to these questions. We do so in four parts. First, we clarify the problem and
consider some different approaches to it. Second, we reject some previous attempts to solve the problem. Third, we turn to a consideration of the underlying concepts of negligence law and indicate how we think they might bear on
the problem at hand. And, finally, we outline and defend our own solution.
Our approach to the problem of factual uncertainty is in the spirit of some
recent remarks made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Resurfice Corp. v.
Hanke.' In a brief discussion of factual causation, the Court suggested that the
but-for test might be set aside where it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs injury "due to factors that are outside of the plaintiffs control; for example, current limits of scientific knowledge."'
4.

Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that factual causation "is the principal foundation of
liability in the law of torts." See J.C. Smith & Peter Burns, "Donoghue v. Stephenson: The
Not So Golden Anniversary" (1983) 46 Mod. L. Rev. 147 at 148.

5.

[2007] 1 S.C.R. 333 [Resurfice].

6.

Ibid. at para. 25. This is one of two requirements articulated by the Supreme Court. The
.other requirement is that "the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
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Concerning atypical or exceptional cases in which liability may be imposed,
notwithstanding that the but-for test is not satisfied, the Court then remarked
that the imposition of liability in such cases is justified on the grounds that to do
otherwise "would offend basic notions of fairness and justice. " '
To anticipate, one of our goals is to offer an account of what the Supreme
Court of Canada might have meant by its reference to "basic notions of fairness and justice." We will argue that to resolve various problem cases, attention
should be paid not to the nature and structure of the concept of causation, but
rather to the underlying normative principles on which tort law is based. We
will focus on what are sometimes called "reciprocal norms of conduct." These
reciprocal norms of conduct impose obligations on individuals to maintain fair
terms of interaction with one another. Our claim is that tort law's commitment
to maintaining fair terms of interaction between individuals, a commitment
that typically requires a plaintiff to establish causation using the but-for test,
sometimes allows, in atypical cases, for the imposition of liability absent but-for
causation.
In particular, we will argue that the but-for requirement should be abandoned in situations where multiple defendants impose the same unreasonable
risk on a plaintiff, where that plaintiff suffers the very sort of harm that rendered
the risk unreasonable, and where the plaintiff cannot prove which of the defendants was in fact the but-for cause of her loss. Our goal is not to discuss every
possible situation that gives rise to a problem of factual uncertainty. Rather, we
aim to articulate a framework for addressing the problem of factual uncertainty,
and to explain why the particular approach to the problem that we outline in
what follows is preferable to other approaches.

I. THE PROBLEM
We begin with some distinctions. In our view, it is important to recognize that
there are two sorts of ways in which but-for causation fails in atypical cases. Consider the following two cases:
Desert Trek: Phil is setting out on a trip through the desert. He arranges to have a
water barrel placed at the trek's halfway point. Billy puts poison in the water barrel,
thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have
suffered that form of injury."

7. Ibid.
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intending to poison Phil. Keith subsequently empties the barrel, intending that Phil
die of thirst. Upon8 reaching the halFway point of the trek, Phil finds the barrel empty
and dies of thirst.
Hunters: Bob, Jerry, and Mickey are hunting quail. Jerry and Mickey shoot simultaneously, and both fail to take reasonable care to ensure that they are not shooting in
the direction of Bob. Bob is hit and injured by one pellet, although it is impossible
to tell from whose shotgun it was fired.

Note their surface similarity: in both cases we are faced with (1) an intuition that one or both of the defendants is-or should be held-liable for the
plaintiffs injury, together with (2) an inability to say who is the "but-for" cause
of the injury. It is this combination of intuition and failure that makes such
cases atypicaL
Notwithstanding this surface similarity, however, at bottom, the cases are
quite different. In Desert Trek, we cannot say that Billy is the but-for cause of
Phil's injury. Phil would still have died even if Billy had not poisoned the barrel,
since the barrel was empty thanks to Keith. The same argument can be made
with respect to Keith: Phil still would have died even if Keith had not emptied
the barrel because it would have been full of poisoned water. Note that the
problem is not limited to the legal context. Rather, the problem has to do with
our very concept of causation."0 The facts of the case are not in dispute, and,

8.

See J.A. McLaughlin, "Proximate Cause" (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149 at 155; H.L.A. Hart
& Tony Honor6, Causationin the Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) at 239.

9.

See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) [Summers]; Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830
[Cook]. For a similar set of facts leading to a different outcome, see Lange v. Bennett, [1964]
1 O.R. 233 (H.C.J.). Situations ofhistorical uncertainty arise with various combinations of
candidate causes: both potential causes might be tortious, or only one might; one potential
cause might be the plaintiffs own negligence; or there may be more than two potential
causes. We will, by and large, discuss only the paradigm case of two tortious candidate
causes. The other variations are discussed, briefly, at the end of this article.

10.

See e.g. David Lewis, "Causation as Influence" (2000) 97 J. Phil. 182. Lewis's examples
make clear the importance of causal uncertainty in these types of situations in a way that
does not often arise in the legal arena. Consider a situation in which two bullets are shot at a
glass and in which the first breaks the glass a millisecond before the second. Lewis argues that
such examples create problems for many general accounts of causation quite apart from any
problems such examples pose for legal causation in particular. In the legal realm, causal
indeterminacy occurs in several forms: overdetermination cases and duplicative or successive
causation cases. For overdetermination cases, see e.g. Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct. 1902) [Corey]. For the two most common duplicative or successive causation
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while we know exactly who did what to whom, and when, we are still unable to say who in fact caused Phil's injury. This sort of case is one of causal
indeterminacy.
Hunters, however, presents a different problem. That problem is traceable
to a lack of knowledge about exactly what occurred when the plaintiff was injured. A pellet hit Bob, but it is impossible to tell whether the pellet came from
Jerry's gun or from Mickey's gun. In this situation, we are again unable to establish on the balance of probabilities which shot was the but-for.cause of Bob's
injury. However, the difference in this case is that the problem is not with our
concept of causation. Rather, the problem in cases such as Hunters involves a
lack of knowledge concerning the underlying facts. For this reason, Hunters is a
1
case of historicaluncertainty."
Presented this way, the differences between cases of causal indeterminacy
and cases of historical uncertainty seem relatively clear: one set of cases involves
a puzzle that is traceable to our concept of causation; the other set of cases involves a puzzle that is traceable to our (lack of) epistemic access to certain facts.
But, as we noted, the two sorts of cases also share an important similarity: in
both situations, we are unable to say on the balance of probabilities whether a
particular defendant in fact caused the plaintiff's injury. This similarity is brought
into sharper focus when we turn to the legal context.
Courts, when faced with cases that fit into one of these two categories, have
often evinced concern that an application of the normal but-for test for causation would result in unfairness, since, in both Desert Trek and Hunters, neither
defendant would be found liable, and the plaintiff would be left without a rem-

11.

cases, see e.g. Baker v. Willoughby, [19701 A.C. 467 (H.L.) [Baker];Joblingv. Associated
Dairies Ltd., [1981] 2 All E.R. 752 (H.L.) [obling].
The term is owed to Jane Stapleton. See Jane Stapleton, "Perspectives on Causation" in
Jeremy Horder, ed., Oxford Essays onJurisprudence,4th Series (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000). As we noted above, the uncertainty in cases of historical uncertainty usually
arises out of a lack of scientific knowledge. Moreover, while the fact patterns of Cook, supra
note 9, and Summers, supra note 9, would seem to be extremely rare, the same problem arises
on other facts. Litigation involving mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos raises the
same issues: the disease is caused by exposure to asbestos, but the most up-to-date
epidemiology of the disease cannot determine, as between two sets of exposure to asbestos,
which of them caused the disease. See Fairchildv. Glenhaven FuneralServices, [2003] 1 A.C.
32 (H.L.) [Fairchild] and, more recently, Sienkiewicz v. Greif(UK) Ltd., [2009] EWCA Civ
1159 [Sienkiewicz].
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edy for an injury that seems clearly to have resulted from somebody's wrongdoing.
In light of this concern-and consistent with the normal methods of commonlaw reasoning-courts try to describe, in the abstract, the reasons for thinking
that the but-for test may be inappropriate in these situations.
Notwithstanding these legal similarities, it should be clear that the underlying conceptualissues at play in the two sorts of cases are essentially very different,
and that the imposition of liability on the defendants in the two sorts of atypical cases might require different explanation and justification. It is notable that
many of the existing attempts to understand the problem of factual causation
centre on cases of causal indeterminacy, such as Desert Trek. Unfortunately, such
analyses fail to provide a solution to the problem posed by cases of historical
uncertainty exemplified by Hunters. We, therefore, propose to focus our arialysis on such cases, since, in our view, the relevant normative issues are presented
more starkly there.
That said, set aside for the moment the distinction between cases of causal
indeterminacy and cases of historical uncertainty, and consider the class of
atypical cases as a whole. The question to be answered is: what distinguishes
atypical cases from typical cases? It is obviously not to the point to call a case
atypical simply to account for the possibility that but-for causation is not required for liability to be imposed on the defendant. That ignores the crucial
issue, namely why but-for causation is not required in such a case. Nor is it
sufficient to simply enumerate the categories of cases in which the requirement
of but-for causation has been abandoned, or has otherwise proven to be inadequate or problematic (a list that would include not only cases like Desert Trek 2
5
"
and Hunters,13 but also learned intermediary cases, informed consent cases,1
simultaneous causation cases, 16 and, more generally, cases where broad considerations of fairness and justice dictate that normal rules of causation should be
suspended"7 ). Such an enumeration again leaves us wondering why those sorts
Baker, supra note 10; Jobling,supra note 10.
See e.g. Cook, supra note 9; Summers, supra note 9; and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) [Sindell].
14.. Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp., [19951 4 S.C.R. 634; Walker Estate v. York Finch General
Hospital, 2001] 1 S.C.R. 647.
15. Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192; Reiblv. Hughes, [19801 2 S.C.R. 880.
12.

13.

16.
17.

Corey, supra note 10.
Such cases state that a "material contribution test" should be used instead. See e.g. Athey v.
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of cases should be treated differently from typical cases, in which but-for causation is required. What leads us to think that such cases ought to be classified as
atypical and abnormal?" The problem, in short, is that while courts appear to
be prepared to set aside a core determinant of negligence liability in some cases,
the explanation for doing so remains unclear.
II. SOME OPTIONS
Faced with this problem, four options present themselves. The first and least attractive option is to do nothing and proceed as if the problem identified above
requires no explanation. We will ignore this option in what follows.
The second option is to resolve the puzzle in favour of the atypical case by
rejecting the centrality of factual causation altogether, and arguing that factual
causation should never be a requirement for the imposition of negligence liability. Thus, a defendant's unreasonable imposition of risk on a plaintiff, together
with the materialization of that risk in injury to that plaintiff, should always
and everywhere suffice for the imposition of liability on the defendant. This
option might be justified by endorsing an account of tort law that emphasizes,
from the point of view of both plaintiffs and defendants, certain principles of
fairness. 9 Or it might be justified instead by appeal to an account of tort law
that emphasizes the importance of extrinsic policy goals related to deterrence
and compensation, rather than by reference to the actual relationship between a
particular plaintiff and defendant. This latter sort of account is characteristic of
certain instrumental approaches to negligence liability.
Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458; Wardlaw v. Bonnington Castings Ltd., [1956] A.C. 613
(H.L.); McGhee v. National CoalBoard,[1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 (H.L.) [McGhee]; Fairchild,
supra note 11; Sienkiewicz, supra note 11; and Barker, supra note 2 [material contribution
cases].
18.

There are obvious echoes here of Lord Atkin's famous judgment in Donoghue v. Stevenson.
One reason why that case has the status that it does is because Lord Atkin purported to
identify an underlying conceptual structure to negligence law by subsuming under a general
principle-the neighbour principle-disparate categories of cases where negligence-like
liability had previously been imposed. See [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) [Donoghue]. For a similar
judgment, see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

19.

See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, "Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss" in David G. Owen,
ed., PhilosophicalFoundationsof Tort Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 387;
Christopher H. Schroeder, "Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law" (1990) 38
UCLA L. Rev. 143.
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A third option is to resolve the puzzle in favour of the typical case by accepting that factual causation is a sine qua non of negligence liability, and by arguing
that there should be no liability where factual causation cannot be established."0
This view might seem to be suggested, or even entailed, by corrective justice
approaches to negligence liability, which require the defendant and plaintiff to
be linked via the mechanism of factual causation as doer and sufferer of the
same wrong.
A fourth option is to find a way to reconcile the role played, or not played,
by factual causation in typical and atypical cases. Such a reconciliation can be
pursued in different ways. One way-the more familiar way-is to critically
evaluate the concept of causation at work in negligence law with an eye towards
reforming the concept, or possibly replacing it altogether. According to proponents of this view-which we call the "Reevaluate Causation" view-the problem
of factual uncertainty is traceable to instability or incoherence in our underlying
concept of causation. 2 Therefore, according to proponents of this view, perhaps
an alternative account of causation might allow us to see how the requirement
of factual causation can be met even in atypical cases.
The Reevaluate Causation view is an intriguing strategy, and much interesting work has been done to articulate and defend it. 2 It is not, however, our
strategy. There are several reasons for this..First, we believe that the strategy we
do pursue-which concentrates on the normative structure of negligence lawis the more promising strategy in the long term. Second, it is far from clear that
the Reevaluate Causation strategy can provide a justification of liability that applies to all atypical cases. This point should be particularly clear in light of the
distinctions drawn above. That is because there is no sensible notion of causation according to which we can say that both defendants in Hunters caused the
plaintiff's injury, and, so, no sensible notion of causation that can underlie the
20.

See Brian T. Hogan, "Cook v. Lewis Re-examined" (1961) 24 Mod. L. Rev. 331.

21.

Richard Wright's efforts
on this
front have been the most sustained and influential. See
Richard W. Wright, "Causation in Tort Law" (1985) 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735 [Wright,
"Causation"]; Richard W. Wright, "Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked
Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts" (1988) 73 Iowa
L. Rev. 1001 [Wright, "Pruning"]; and Richard W. Wright, "Once More into the Bramble
Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility" (2001) 753 Vand.
L. Rev. 1071. Wright's work follows from the influential treatment of causation by Hart &
Honor6, supra note 8.Also useful in this regard is the work of Stapleton, supra note 11.

22.

Ibid.
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imposition of liability on both defendants. In Desert Trek, on the other hand,
such a strategy does seem fruitful because there does seem to be a sense of "cause"
according to which the defendants did cause the plaintiffs injury. Nonetheless,
because it is clear in Hunters that one and only one defendant caused the plaintiff s injury, no amount of massaging the concept of causation will be sufficient,
we think, to solve Hunters. We say more about this below.
In our view, a better way to reconcile the typical and atypical cases is to think
harder, not about the nature and structure of the concept of causation, but,
rather, about the normative underpinnings of negligence liability quite generally.
Pursuing this strategy requires articulating an account of negligence liability
that can explain the following: (1) the insistence on the requirement of but-for
causation in typical cases; (2) the abandonment of the requirement in atypical
cases; and (3) a principled distinction between the two types of cases. This is a
challenge. Nonetheless, we will argue that there is some plausibility to the idea
that underlying normative considerations make room, in a principled manner,
for the importance of factual or but-for causation in typical cases, while also allowing us to dispense with it in certain atypical ones. Our thought is this: just
as the general reasons for imposing negligence liability in a given case ought also
to be reasons for limiting that liability, so too ought the reasons for insisting on
the requirement of factual causation in typical cases be reasons for limiting or
dispensing with it in atypical cases. This is one thing that might be meant by
the claim that, in atypical cases, principles of justice and fairness permit aban23
doning the requirement of but-for causation. Or so we will claim.

III. SOME FAILED APPROACHES
It is useful to consider some examples of unsuccessful approaches to the problem
of factual uncertainty to help further clarify the issues at play. One early and interesting attempt is visible in the work of Wex Malone. Malone is a proponent of the
second way of resolving the problem of factual uncertainty set out above: he favours abandoning the but-for causation requirement entirely, or at least subsuming
it under the broader policy goals of tort law. Here is the heart of his argument:

23.

We are not alone in claiming this. For a similar approach to the problem of factual
uncertainty, see Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, "Corrective Justice in an Age of
Mass Torts" in Gerald J. Postema, ed., Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 214.
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All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are the product of a legislature or
are a part of the fabric of the court-made law of negligence, exist for purposes. They
are designed to protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks...
The task of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in 24its policy aspects is one
that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it arises.

Thus:
Whenever it can be said with fair certainty that the rule of conduct relied upon by
the plaintiff was designed to protect against the very type of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed, courts have shown very little patience
with the efforts of defendant
25
to question the sufficiency of the proof on cause.

The picture that emerges is something like the following: the task of defining the scope of a particular risk-proscribing legal rule is a policy matter that
must be undertaken anew each time a case comes before the courts. As a result,
where a legal rule proscribes a very particular sort of risk, and where that risk
materializes in harm, courts will not scrutinize the factual causation inquiry too
carefully. This is because such a decision is a policy matter having to do with the
purposes that the legal rule was designed to serve. The ultimate consequence of
this approach is that the factual causation inquiry becomes part of the proximate
cause inquiry, making the determination of a particular defendant's liability
almost entirely a matter of policy. In this respect, Malone's position prefigures
that of many contemporary law and economics scholars, such as Ronald Coase
and Guido Calabresi.26
Another approach to factual causation can be extracted from Coase's famous
article, "The Problem of Social Cost. '27 Consider, as Coase does, Bryant v.
Lefever. 28 The defendant built up an exterior wall and piled timber on his roof
in a manner that interfered with the wind that, for years, had blown over the
plaintiff's chimneys. As a result, when the plaintiff lit a fire in any of his fireplaces, the smoke stayed in his house. The plaintiff brought an action against

24.

Wex S. Malone, "Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact" (1956) 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 at 62. For
criticism, see Wright, "Causation," supra note 21 at 1806.

25.

Malone, ibid. at 73.

26.

Calabresi famously called causation a "weasel" word that masks the cost-benefit calculations
that properly underpin negligence law. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents: A Legal
andEconomic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) at 6-7.

27.

Ronald H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 J.L. & Econ. 1.

28.

[187.91 4 C.P.D. 172 (Eng.).
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the defendant for nuisance, claiming that the defendant, in building up his
wall, had detrimentally affected the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property. At trial, the plaintiff was awarded damages, but, on appeal, the judgment
was reversed on the ground that the defendant had not caused the nuisance
complained of. Bramwell L.J., in the Court of Appeal, said:
No doubt there is a nuisance, but itisnot of the defendant's causing. ... It is the
plaintiff who causes the nuisance by lighting a coal fire in a place the chimney of
which is placed so near the defendants' wall, that the smoke does not escape, but
comes into the house. Let the plaintiff cease to light his fire,29let him move his chimney, let him carry ithigher, and there would be no nuisance.

Or, as Cotton L.J. said: "The plaintiff creates the smoke, which interferes with
his comfort."3 Coase criticized this conclusion, arguing that it is "fairly clear"
that the "smoke nuisance was caused both by the man who built the wall and
by the man who lit the fires," and that "[i]f we are to discuss the problem in
terms of causation, both parties cause the damage."31 Since the plaintiff and
defendant both caused the nuisance, Coase concluded that both the plaintiff
and the defendant ought to "be forced to include the loss of amenity due to the
smoke as a cost in deciding whether to continue the activity which gives rise to
the smoke."32 The causal inquiry was therefore replaced by a comparative analysis of burdens and benefits, which, in Coase's view, were to be shared equally by
plaintiff and defendant.
There are two ways to read Coase here. On the one hand, we might understand Coase's argument to be an extreme form of the Reevaluate Causation view.
In this interpretation, Coase is arguing that, while causation has a role to play
in tort law, the but-for approach to causation should be abandoned. On this
reading, Coase keeps company with those whose have sought to solve the problem of factual causation in law by trying to re-evaluate the idea of causation.
Richard Wright, the most prominent proponent of this approach, has argued
that, rather than understanding factual causation using the but-for test, we
ought to understand it,instead, through the lens of what he called the NESS
test. On this view, a defendant satisfies the factual causation requirement if his

29. Ibid. at 179.
30. Ibid. at 181.
31. Coase, supra note 27 at13.
32.

Ibid.
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conduct is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set of circumstances that led to
the plaintiff's loss.33 Wright unpacks this as follows: "[A] particular condition
was a cause of (contributed to) a specific result if and only if it was a necessary
element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occur34
rence of the result."
To illustrate Wright's analysis, consider how it applies to Desert Trek: both
Billy's poisoning of Phil's water barrel and Keith's emptying of it are elements
of a set of events that is sufficient to ensure Phil's death. And both Billy's and
Keith's acts are necessary elements of that set, since the set would be different if
either were removed. Therefore, both Billy's poisoning and Keith's emptying
are NESS causes of Phil's death. Wright's approach can be questioned either on
the ground that it is confusing (for judges and juries, as well as for legal philosophers) or on the ground that, by relying too heavily on general causal laws, it
does not capture a real notion of causation. 3' From our point of view, however,
the real' problem with the NESS proposal is that it cannot explain Hunters. There
is no general causal principle that yields the conclusion that two different individuals must shoot at a third in order for the third to be hit by the shot of one
of the shooters. So it appears that the Reevaluate Causation strategy cannot
explain Hunters or other historical uncertainty cases. This is an important strike
against it, and an important reason to pursue a different strategy.
Returning to Coase, we said that there are two ways to understand his argument in "The Problem of Social Cost." The first way is to view him as pursuing
a version of the Reevaluate Causation strategy. But a second reading of Coase is
possible. Rather than viewing him as a proponent of the Reevaluate Causation
strategy, Coase might instead be seen as making the same sort of argument as
Malone, given that the upshot of Coase's argument is that issues having to do
with the cost of precautions ought to determine liability. On this interpretation,
Coase is not proposing to re-evaluate the concept of causation at work in negligence law. Rather, he is proposing to do away with it entirely.
If the arguments ofCCoase and Malone were compelling, they would give us
reasons for dispensing with the requirement of factual causation altogether. But
these arguments are not compelling. The problem with these sorts of arguments
33.

See Wright's major works on causation, supra note 21.

34.

Wright, "Pruning," supra note 21 at 1019.

35.

See e.g. Antony Honor6, "Causation in the Law," online: Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law>.
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is a simple one: insofar as they seek to efface various entrenched legal concepts,
they fail to take law seriously as law. As Ernest Weinrib has argued:
When economic analysis is presented as the key to understanding tort law, the point
of the analysis is not to take the fundamental concepts seriously as concepts used in
legal practice, but to render them otiose. Economic analysis has its own stock of
ideas that operate without reference to the legal concepts. The result is that ideas
about economic efficiency replace rather than illuminate the legal concepts. Instead
of functioning as vehicles of thought, the legal concepts are at most labels pinned to
36
conclusions once economic analysis has done all the work.

That the law of negligence relies on the concept of factual causation to determine the existence and scope of liability is not in doubt. To be sure, it may
turn out that to resolve problems of factual uncertainty, we need to re-evaluate
or replace our concept of causation, and reflect on the normative assumptions
that underlie it. But such replacement should be the conclusion of an argument,
not a premise in one. For this reason, we propose to set aside approaches that
seek to replace the concept of factual causation with something else-such approaches being, in our view, antithetical to understanding negligence law on its
own .terms.

IV. TAKING TORT LAW SERIOUSLY
To this point we have posed a problem and described different possible solutions
to it. We have suggested that two familiar responses to this problem, the Reevaluate Causation strategy of Wright (and, on one reading, Coase), and the strategy
of Malone (and, on another reading, Coase) that dispenses with the requirement
of factual causation altogether, are unsatisfactory because they either fail to offer
a solution in cases in which a solution is required, or fail to take tort law seriously
as law. Ernest Weinrib and Arthur Ripstein are two scholars who accept the notion that any attempt to understand negligence law must take its component
concepts seriously. Turning to their views, we can begin to construct an account
of factual uncertainty that attempts to understand tort law on its own terms.
"A Step Forward in Factual Causation" is, by no means, a recent article,

36.

Ernest J. Weinrib, "Can Law Survive Legal Education?" (2007) 60 Vand. L. Rev. 401 at
407. For similar arguments that a proper understanding of tort law requires taking seriously
its key concepts, see Jules L. Coleman, The Practiceof Principle(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001); Benjamin C. Zipursky, "Pragmatic Conceptualism" (2000) 6 Legal Theory 457.
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having been published in 1975,"v but it remains instructive all the same. In it,
Weinrib makes two suggestions regarding the nature of factual causation. First,
he suggests that, in light of various (then recent) developments in the law of
negligence, a return to first principles is needed inthinking about factual causation. Second, he suggests that having returned to first principles, we must be
sensitive to the way in which normative considerations can be relevant to the
factual causation inquiry. In connection with the House of Lord's decision in
McGhee v. National CoalBoard,38 Weinrib states:
[T]he very existence of the cause in fact inquiry is the expression of certain more abstract considerations of fairness. At stake is a balance between the innocent victim's
claim to be compensated and the freedom of the defendant to be as wicked as he likes
as long as no injurious consequences flow from that wickedness. The weighing of these
competing interests is, of course, not a value-free process. Accordingly, while in easy
cases an automatic application of the factual approach will satisfactorily resolve the
competing factors and reflect the balance inherent in the approach itself, we must always be prepared to test the cause in fact process against the underlying policies and
purposes that it embodies, and to adjust the ordinary method of dealing
39 with cause
in fact if it fails adequately to reflect our more basic notions of fairness.

Weinrib's point is not that the cause in fact inquiry is irreducibly valueladen. To the contrary, as he points out, "[g]iven the existence of the cause in
fact requirement, denial of its essentially value-free nature would be as futile as
attempting to prove the internal inconsistency of a tautology.""0 Instead, Weinrib's point is that the cause in fact inquiry does not take place in a vacuum. It is,
rather, part of a larger inquiry into liability and responsibility that presupposes
and rests on various normative considerations. Thus, although the cause in fact
inquiry may not be explicitly normative in the way in which the duty of care or
proximate cause inquiries are normative, broader normative issues may still be
implicated in the analysis of factual causation.
We are in general agreement with Weinrib's idea that, even if the factual
causation inquiry is value-free, certain normative principles are implicated in
that inquiry all the same. However, this idea needs further elaboration and development. Weinrib's discussion of factual causation was written in a period in

37.
38.
39.
40.

Ernest J. Weinrib, "A Step Forward in Factual Causation" (1975) 38 Mod. L. Rev. 518.
McGhee,supra note 17.
Weinrib, supra note 37 at 530.
Ibid.
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which he had yet to fully develop his current views on tort law, and, so, stands
apart from them. Consequently, it is not clear whether, when Weinrib said that
"we must always be prepared to test the cause in fact process against the underlying policies and purposes that it embodies," he had fully worked out the nature
of those policies and purposes. 1 Without such an account, Weinrib's treatment
of the factual uncertainty problem would seem to be incomplete. Of course,
Weinrib now famously has just such an account-one anchored in Aristotle's
theory of corrective justice and Kant's conception of the will-and, so, perhaps
his previous treatment of the problem of factual uncertainty can now be completed. 2 However, rather than investigate whether Weinrib's current views about
negligence liability are consistent with his past views about the role played by
cause in fact, we will, in what follows, base our analysis on a different account
of the underlying nature of tort law-that of Arthur Ripstein.Y
We adopt Ripstein's view here, largely because we believe that Ripstein presents the clearest account of tort law available that takes seriously its underlying
concepts. As such, it brings out important aspects of tort doctrine on which we
wish to ground our analysis." Very briefly, Ripstein defends the idea that tort

41.

Indeed, it isdoubtful that Weinrib would use the words "policies" and "purposes" here at all
anymore. As he has remarked more recently, "[pirivate law, I will claim, is to be grasped only
from within and not as the juridical manifestation of a set of extrinsic purposes. If we must
express this intelligibility in terms of purpose, the only thing to be said is that the purpose of
private law is to be private law." See Weinrib, supra note 3 at 5.

42.

See Weinrib, ibid.

43.

See especially Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999) [Ripstein, Equality]; Arthur Ripstein, "Philosophy of Tort Law" in
Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., The Oxford Handbook ofJurisprudence& Philosophy of
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 656 [Ripstein, "Tort Law"]; and Arthur
Ripstein, "As If It Had Never Happened" (2007) 48 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1957 [Ripstein,
"Happened"]. See also Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, "Mischief and Misfortune" (1995)
41 McGill L.J. 91.

44.
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negligence law. Where they diverge is in their understanding of the basis or justification of
the underlying normative principles involved. As noted above, Weinrib seeks to ground
negligence law's normative structure in Aristotelian notions of corrective justice and Kantian
ideas about the ability of rational agents to determine their own ends; Ripstein appeals
instead to the notion of the representative reasonable person. For further discussion, see
Ripstein, Equality, ibid. at 53.
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law seeks to enforce a system of reciprocal norms of conduct."5 On Ripstein's
view, to say that the defendant should be liable for the plaintiffs loss is to say
that the defendant did something that the plaintiff had a right to be free from.
Ripstein is concerned, in part, with rebutting the suggestion made by Holmes
in The Common Law that the "moral phraseology" in which the law abounds
should not be taken at face value. 6 Ripstein begins by noting that tort law is
primarily concerned with rights and wrongs rather than with harms or losses.
The point is a familiar one: many situations in which individuals suffer harms
or losses are not situations where the law takes an interest, and, at other times,
the law takes an interest in situations where individuals have suffered no harms
or losses at all. 7 However, because tort law is primarily concerned with wrongs,
it must embody a normative approach to liability. It must be capable of distinguishing wrongful interferences with the rights of others that lead to losses from
harms that result from non-wrongful, but perhaps otherwise lamentable, conduct.
How do these observations bear on the problem of factual uncertainty?
Consider cases of successive tortious causation, which are a subset of the category
of causal indeterminacy set out above. It might be thought that these are cases in
which normative considerations entail that the plaintiff should recover, on the
grounds that it would be contrary to principles of justice and fairness to hold
otherwise. Since an innocent plaintiff has been harmed, it would be unfair to allow
one defendant to benefit from another defendant's wrongdoing. However, while
embracing the conclusion that the plaintiff should recover, Ripstein takes issue
with this too-easy analysis. The problem, as he sees it, is that, if the grounds for
liability are located solely in the relationship between the wrongdoers, the plaintiff
would become a bystander or "'vicarious beneficiary' of the distaste a court
rightly has for [the] wrongdoers' claim of advantage from each other." 8 Instead,
returning to tort law's underlying normative principles, Ripstein reminds us that
rights survive wrongs, and that this fact can explain cases of successive causation.

45.

For this view's inspiration, see John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971); John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism,2d ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005). A similar approach can be found in Gregory C. Keating,
"Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory" (1995) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311.

46.

See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 79.

47. For an extended discussion of the latter, see Arthur Ripstein, "Beyond the Harm Principle"
(2006) 34 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 215.
48. Ripstein, "Happened," supra note 43 at 1988.
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The argument is seen most easily if we consider another example:
Car Crash:Jesse is injured by George's negligent driving and sues George for lost

income resulting from the injury. Before trial, Jesse is injured again, this time as a
result of Lloyd's negligent driving. Jesse loses his leg.9 George claims that he is not
liable for the lost income after Jesse's second accident.

According to Ripstein's analysis, Jesse can still recover against George because Jesse continues to have a right against George: that George take due care
with respect to Jesse's safety. Jesse has that right even if George fails to take due
care. And since rights survive wrongs, Jesse continues to have that right, even
if Lloyd also fails to take due care with respect to Jesse's safety. So where the
second of two successive causes of injury is tortious, the plaintiff will be able to
anchor his right to recover from the first tortfeasor in an instance of wrongdoing
rather than in an instance of mere harm. Consequently, where we have successive and simultaneous tortious causes, Ripstein states:
[Elach defendant is liable because the only respect in which either one can point to
the other is as a subsequent wrongdoer. Defendant cannot say that plaintiffs horse already was startled, but only that it would have been startled anyway-that is, that
plaintiff would have been wronged anyway. That is exactly the claim that plaintiff's
right does not survive wrongdoing. 50

On the other hand, this argument will not succeed in cases where the second cause of injury is non-tortious, since the defendant can say that, because the
plaintiff would have been injured anyway-but not as a result of his or anybody
else's wrongdoing-such injury is not something that the plaintiff had a right
to be free from. In such cases, the defendant should not be held liable for the
plaintiff's additional injuries.
Another example may help here:
Lightning: Jesse is injured by George's negligent driving and sues George for lost income resulting from the injury. Before trial, Jesse is injured again, this time as the result of a lightning strike. Jesse loses his leg. George claims that he is not liable for the
lost income after Jesse's second accident.5

In this case, Jesse cannot recover from George for the lost income consequent
on the lightning strike, because the use of his leg after the strike is not something
49.

These are roughly the facts of Baker, supra note 10.

50.

Ripstein, "Happened," supra note 43 at 1990.
This is a modification of Jobling,supra note 10.

51.
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to which he has a right. In other words, George can legitimately point to the
intervention of a non-tortious cause of injury to insulate him from (full) liability.
The upshot is that, according to Ripstein, it makes a difference whether the
cause of plaintiffs injury was something that he or she had a right to be free
from, or whether it was something that simply happened to him or her. This
distinction is normative in nature, having to do with rights and wrongs rather
than with harms and benefits.
The foregoing has been rather quick, but it serves to illustrate our general
point: the arguments that Ripstein advances, and the principles on which he
relies, generate the correct resolution in cases of duplicative or successive causation. Moreover, these principles are normative through and through, focusing
on rights and wrongs rather than on benefits and harms. Still, in our view, there
is more to be said about cases of historical uncertainty (exemplified by Hunters).
This is, perhaps, not surprising, given that the problem in those cases is that we
do not know enough about what happened to the plaintiff. Still, we would like
to fill in what we perceive to be a gap in this general approach to the problem
of factual uncertainty. Consequently, in Part V, below, we draw on Weinrib
and Ripstein's accounts of tort law to provide a set of principles to which we
should return when dealing with cases of historical uncertainty.

V. EXTENDING THE PROPOSAL
We have argued that, to resolve the problem of factual uncertainty, we must return
to and reconsider the underlying normative principles of negligence law. We have
suggested that the proper way to approach the problem is not to tinker with the
concept of causation, nor to replace the cause in fact inquiry with some other form
of investigation, such as a comparative analysis of the overall benefits and burdens
shared by plaintiff and defendant. Rather, what require consideration are the basic
rights or entitlements that underlie the imposition of liability in negligence quite
generally. Since, however, these rights or entitlements manifest themselves differently in typical and atypical cases, what is required for justice to be done will
differ in corresponding ways. It would therefore be a mistake to conclude that
atypical cases, in which the requirement of factual causation is altered or dispensed
with, constitute exceptions to the basic structure of negligence law. Instead, atypical
cases represent situations in which the typical normative principles at work in negligence law are worked out in atypical fashion. Therefore, such cases call for "a
sensitive and pragmatic approach in the elaboration and modification of the pro-

682

12009147 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

cedures through which [negligence law's] normative structure is applied." 2 The
argument to be made in this section is this: the underlying principles of negligence law require that, in a case like Hunters, both defendants should be held
liable for the plaintiff's injuries, even though neither of them can be found, on
the balance of probabilities, to be the but-for cause of the plaintiffs loss.
To make this argument out, we first need to say more about the "underlying principles of negligence law." According to Ripstein's analysis, tort law
concerns, at bottom, two sorts of principles or norms: first, norms of reciprocal
conduct, according to which people accept reciprocal limits on their freedom
and attempt to guide their behaviour with principles of fair interaction; and
second, norms of liability or repair, according to which people agree to bear the
costs that their (unreasonable) conduct imposes on others when that conduct
materializes in harm. 3 Again, norms of conduct are the norms governing behaviour that reasonable people would accept as binding on themselves in a democratic society. Norms of liability are the flip-side of norms of conduct: when
a defendant breaches a norm of conduct and a plaintiff is injured as a result, the
defendant is required to repair the wrong by making the plaintiff whole.
By way of illustration, consider again the case of duplicative or successive
causation. To resolve the sorts of problems that arise in those contexts, we first
ask whether the plaintiff had a right to be free from the defendant's interference. This is a question about norms of conduct, since we are asking whether
the defendant was under a duty to exercise care with respect to the plaintiff. If
the answer to this first question is yes, then the plaintiff has a right to recovery
that is good against the defendant, even where a second defendant does something that the plaintiff also has a right to be free from. Again, this is part of
what it means to say that rights survive wrongs. So, in Car Crash, the reason
Jesse is entitled to recover from George, even though Lloyd has subsequently
infringed Jesse's right, is that the second injury in no way altered the norm of
conduct that entailed that Jesse had a right against George." In typical cases, it
is clear that factual causation is a manifestation of these underlying normative
52.

Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 23 at 244.

53.

Ripstein, "Tort Law," supra note 43 at 660-61. Some authors (possibly including Ripstein in
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principles-as Weinrib puts it, "in easy cases an automatic application of the
factual approach will satisfactorily resolve the competing factors.""5 Additionally, as Ripstein convincingly argues, in certain atypical cases-such as those
involving successive and duplicative causation-those same normative principles allow us to resolve certain difficulties.
In our view, however, those same considerations suggest that defendants in
other atypical cases, namely cases of historical uncertainty, such as Hunters, ought
also to be held liable for the plaintiffs loss, even though but-for factual causation
cannot be proved on the balance of probabilities. The general reason is that
imposing liability in such cases more fairly preserves the terms of interaction
between the parties set by the associated norms of conduct, and more fairly
allocates the costs that a defendant imposes on a plaintiff. In other words, the
imposition of liability in cases of historical uncertainty reflects nothing more
than a different manifestation of the general normative principles that warrant
the imposition of negligence liability in typical cases.
More specifically, to allow defendants to escape liability in situations of historical uncertainty would permit those defendants to unilaterally set the terms
of interaction between themselves and a given plaintiff. Defendants would be
allowed to put their interests in liberty ahead of the plaintiffs interest in security,
without having to bear the costs that their risks impose on others. This would
violate both norms of reciprocal conduct and norms of liability, and would
entail that, while the defendants would have done something that they were not
entitled to do, they would be absolved from liability, even though their careless
action resulted in harm to the plaintiff. Holding defendants liable in such cases,
therefore, preserves fair terms of interaction because it does not impose on those
defendants new or further restrictions of their liberty, and, at the same time,
'better preserves the security interests of the injured plaintiff.
Let us apply the argument to Hunters. By failing to take reasonable care with
respect to Bob's safety, Jerry and Mickey violated the norms of reciprocal conduct that governed their relationship with him. Had either of them been the
sole defendant, and had Bob been injured as a result of their carelessness, the
norms of conduct in play would have required them to pay damages to Bob. In
the case at hand, both Jerry and Mickey have breached the terms of interaction
that were set independently of considerations of factual uncertainty. Thus, to

55.

Weinrib, supra note 37 at 530.
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hold them liable in such an atypical case imposes no further restriction on their
liberty than those already imposed in the typical case. On the other hand, to
allow Jerry and Mickey to insist on the centrality of factual causation and let
the losses lie on Bob would allow Jerry and Mickey to, in effect, set the terms of
their interaction with Bob unilaterally.

VI. SOME OBJECTIONS
Viewed in this way, our proposal flows naturally from very general, and in our
view, very plausible, principles about the nature of negligence liability. 6 This is
not to say, however, that it is free from criticism. So let us briefly discuss some
possible objections.
One worry is that, like functional or instrumental approaches to tort law
that we earlier said we were not going to take seriously, our approach is, at bottom, simply a matter of balancing benefits and burdens, and it is therefore susceptible to the same criticisms we levelled against such approaches. This would
be a mistake, however. Our approach, while it does involve some balancing,
differs from such instrumental approaches in two important ways. First, what are
being balanced are norms of conduct and liability, rather than overall burdens
and benefits. Second, in balancing norms of conduct and liability, we are explicitly appealing to negligence law's own normative concepts.57 We are not
trying to replace them with something else. Thus, unlike functional or instrumental approaches, our approach takes negligence law seriously as law and seeks
to understand it on its own terms.
A second objection to our view is that we have not succeeded in doing what
we set out to do. Recall the challenge we set for ourselves, namely to articulate an
account of negligence liability that can simultaneously explain: (1) the insistence
on the requirement of but-for causation in typical cases; (2) the abandonment of
the requirement in atypical cases; and (3) a principled distinction between the two
types of cases. We have suggested that (1) and (2) are both manifestations of various underlying normative principles having to do with fair terms of interaction. But
it might be objected that we have yet to articulate a principled distinction between
what we have been calling typical and atypical cases. For example, how are courts
to determine whether a case is a typical case, in which but-for causation must be
56. Compare Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 23.
57. For a similar argument, see Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 43.
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established, or whether it is instead an atypical case, in which the cause in fact inquiry can be dispensed with, and the underlying normative principles met in
another manner?
This criticism also misses the mark because it asks too much. 8 To see why,
it helps to consider the relationship between cases of factual uncertainty and the
doctrine of negligence in general. Our proposal is equivalent to the way in which
the "neighbour principle" set out in Donoghue v. Stevenson has been worked out
in negligence law. 9 A law of negligence according to which each case before a
court had to be decided according to a bare-bones and ahistorical application of
the neighbour principle would be inefficient and unproductive, and would
likely involve the court in a series of contradictions. The common law solves
this problem by using case law to contextualize legal rules, and by appealing to
that context to give content to the nature of the" duties we owe one another.
The same is true here. The question to be answered is this: does allowing a
defendant who has failed to take reasonable care to escape liability because of
the presence of a similar defendant upset the terms of interaction between defendants and plaintiff? We think that, in Hunters, the answer is clearly yes.
Other atypical cases will need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.6" If, in a
given case, the imposition of the but-for test seems unfair-because to impose
it would upset the terms of interaction between the parties-that case is at least
a candidate for the account we are offering.
The third objection to our view is that, in cases of historical uncertainty,
our view improperly forces one defendant to bear a loss that may have arisen as
a result of someone else's careless behaviour. Recall that, in cases of historical
uncertainty, it is agreed that the plaintiffs injury was in fact caused by the negligence of at least one of the careless defendants, but not by all of them." Take
a case where there are two careless defendants. In such a case, holding both
defendants liable is guaranteed to impose liability on a party whose carelessness
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did not materialize in any harm or injury. Such a proposa'might, therefore,
seem to fly in the face of the idea that "negligence in the air, so to speak, will
not do."6 2 Again, our reply to this objection is based on a particular conception of the general principles underlying negligence liability. We return to
Weinrib's observation that tort law sometimes calls for "flexibility with respect
to entrenched doctrine." 3 We interpret this to mean that there are times when
considerations of justice and fairness are not sufficiently served by positive doctrine itself, and that, in such cases, appeal must be made to underlying principles
to achieve a just and fair result. This in fact seems to be the attitude taken by
most courts in dealing with these difficult matters."6 This observation, however,
is not demonstrative, and we do not want to rest our argument on the mere recitation of the need for such flexibility. Rather, our goal is to set out a defensible
account of why an approach to tort law based on norms of reciprocal conduct
and liability is consistent with the imposition of liability in cases of historical
uncertainty-that is, in cases where proof of causation is absent.
So, consider, finally, the objection that imposing liability on defendants in
cases of historical uncertainty is unfair, and is unfair in the same way in which
we have argued that a failure to impose such liability is unfair, since imposing
liability allows the plaintiff to unilaterally set the terms of interaction between
the parties. Thus, it might be argued, contrary to what we have suggested, that
the refisal to impose liability on defendants in cases of historical uncertainty
more fairly comports with the fundamental principles of tort law. We have two
general responses to this objection. Our first response is that imposing liability
on defendants is not unfair to defendants in the same sense in which a refusal to
impose liability is unfair to plaintiffs. Our second response is that, if imposing
liability on defendants is unfair to defendants, then this is an unproblematic
form of unfairness.
To suppose that imposing liability on defendants in cases of historical uncertainty is unfair to defendants, in the same way in which a failure to impose
such liability is unfair to plaintiffs, misconstrues what it means to unilaterally
set the terms of interaction between parties. Simply put, by claiming in cases of
62.
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historical uncertainty that the defendant ought to be liable for an injury that he
may not have in fact caused, the injured plaintiff is not unilaterally determining
how her security and liberty interests should be balanced against those of the
defendant. That is because the defendant's careless conduct has already imposed
an unreasonable risk on the plaintiff, and has, thus, already disturbed the terms of
interaction between the parties in a normatively significant way. Consequently,
the situations of plaintiffs and defendants in cases of historical uncertainty are
not analogous.
Even if it is granted that there is some unfairness in imposing liability on
defendants in cases of historical uncertainty, this in our view, is an unproblematic form of unfairness. It pays to remember that tort law is not bound to produce results that leave all parties happy. The fact is that many tort doctrines
involving liability and compensation seem unfair. Take the thin skull principle:
it might be thought to be unfair to hold a defendant liable for the full extent of
a plaintiffs injuries, even when those particular injuries were not foreseeable.
And yet the law insists that, where a defendant has unreasonably imposed a risk
on a plaintiff that materializes into harm, the defendant is responsible for the
full extent of that harm, notwithstanding a lack of foreseeability. Why? Plausibly,
because to hold otherwise would be to allow the defendant to unfairly determine the scope and limits of his liberty interests, and so, by extension, would
allow the defendant to unfairly determine the scope and limits of the plaintiffs
security interests. Similarly, our thought is that, in atypical cases where a defendant has unilaterally imposed a risk of a particular sort of harm on a plaintiff,
and where a harm of that sort ensues, the defendant should not be relieved of
responsibility for that harm simply because it cannot be established using the
traditional but-for test that he harmed the plaintiff. In short, the sense-if there
is a sense-in which the imposition of liability on defendants is unfair seems to
be no different than the unfairness associated with the thin skull principle. It is
the sense in which a child who has been denied candy claims: "It's not fair!"
Such a claim is not about unfairness understood as a normative concept, but,
instead, about unfairness as not getting what you want. In our view, that is not
a problematic kind of unfairness.
The important fact to keep in mind here is that tort law has already set the
fair terms of interaction between the parties by way of its duties of care--duties
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that are independent of any considerations of historical uncertainty. 6 Thus, it
seems to us that situations of historical uncertainty take us back to what we earlier called norms of liability. If we hold that both defendants ought to be liable
for a plaintiff's injury, we do nothing to change the terms of interaction between
the parties. In Hunters, the duties of care that applied to Jerry and Mickey set
the standard against which their behaviour must be measured in order to ensure
a proper balancing of their interests in liberty and Bob's interest in security.
They failed to meet that standard and Bob was injured. But to hold them liable
for Bob's injury would not infringe their interests in liberty, since it is clear that
they have already exceeded the standard that makes that determination. Conversely, if we were to let the loss lie where it fell (on Bob), the fair balance between liberty and security that tort law polices and preserves would be disturbed.
Bob's security interests would not be protected, notwithstanding the fact that,
by failing to act reasonably, Jerry and Mickey improperly favoured their liberty
interests over his security.
In this sort of case, it is not only clear that both defendants created a risk
of harm to the plaintiff, it is also clear that the plaintiff suffered exactly the kind
of injury that made the imposition of risk wrongful in the first place." In these
limited circumstances, imposition of liability on both defendants is the only way
to maintain fair terms of interaction between the parties, and to fairly allocate
the risks associated with their careless conduct. To this extent, we find ourselves
in agreement with Malone's conclusion noted earlier-namely, that where a
legal rule proscribes a very particular sort of risk, and where that risk materializes in harm, courts will not, and should not, scrutinize the cause in fact inquiry
too carefully. We part company, however, when it comes to his arguments for
that conclusion. In our view, this conclusion should not rest on broad, policybased considerations. Rather, the conclusion should be based on normative principles and should be justified on the grounds that a refusal to impose liability
on defendants in cases of causal uncertainty would unfairly promote the liberty
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Ripstein briefly addresses the issues that we are concerned with here, and we are in broad
agreement with what he says. Ripstein's argument, however, relies on the notion of unclean
hands. We think that our argument makes clearer the underlying normative concerns that
make reliance on such an idea plausible. See especially Ripstein, Equality, supra note 43 at 75.
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This may explain the inclusion by the Supreme Court of Canada of the second requirement
for the imposition of liability absent but-for causation in cases of historical uncertainty. See
Resurfice, supra note 5 at para. 25.
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interests of defendants at the expense of the security interests of plaintiffs. To
echo Weinrib: we must be prepared to test the cause in fact process against the
underlying policies and purposes that it embodies, and to adjust the ordinary
method of dealing with cause in fact if it fails to adequately reflect our more
basic notions of fairness.67
In short, we believe that in circumstances of historical uncertainty, imposition of liability better preserves the fair terms of interaction between parties,
provided that (1) all defendants acted negligently towards a given plaintiff, and
(2) that the plaintiff suffered the very kind of harm that the imposition of the
duty of care was supposed to guard against in the first place. 68 The fair terms of
interaction are best preserved by imposing liability in this case, even if there is
no workable concept of cause according to which it can be said that both defendants caused the plaintiff's injury. Nevertheless, the imposition of liability
does not limit the liberty of the defendants any more than it is already limited
by the acknowledged duty of care that they both already breached. Conversely,
to allow the loss to lie where it has fallen, namely on the plaintiff, would be to
unjustly limit his or her security interest by imposing on him or her harm that
falls within the ambit of already acknowledged duties. As a result, preserving
the fair terms of interaction requires imposing liability in cases of genuine historical uncertainty."

67. Weinrib, supra note 37 at 530.
68.

See Fairchild,supra note 11.

69.

A further objection that might be raised here is that liability is being imposed on the basis of
the defendants' breach of the plaintiffs 'remedial right to establish liability.' This was the
argument made by Rand J. in his concurring opinion in Cook, supra note 9. As Rand J.
wrote (at 831-32):
But if the victim, having brought guilt down to one or both of two persons before the court,
can bring home to either of them a further wrong done him in relation to his remedial right
of making that proof, then I should say that on accepted principles, the barrier to it can and
should be removed.
For a similar argument made on an economic basis see Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Tort
Liability Under Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Although the issue is
complicated, we incline towards the view that the remedial right argument is insufficient to
ground liability in cases of historical uncertainty. The reason was first pointed in Hart &
Honor6, supranote 8 at 423. They argued that, because the destruction of the means of
proof was something that happens in many tort cases, it is not limited to cases of historical
uncertainty. Consequently, the destruction of the means of proof is not something that sets
those cases apart from cases in which we do apply the but-for test. The same problem with
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Some final qualifications are in order. First, while we have been speaking in
terms of imposing liability for a plaintiffs injuries on both defendants, some may
prefer to think about the practice of shifting the.burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendants, as.certain courts and commentators have done. 70 In the
end, however, this seems like an unimportant detail. In a civil case, both parties
lead evidence regarding the facts, and, if the plaintiff can produce evidence that
suggests that it was one defendant's shot, rather than another's, that hit and
injured her, and if that evidence is accepted by the trier of fact, then that particular defendant might, on the balance of probabilities, be held liable. In this
sense, issues related to burden shifting seem to be of secondary importance.
Another complication arises when there are more parties to the dispute.
As unlikely as it may seem to have ten defendants in the position that Jerry and
Mickey find themselves in Hunters, we believe that our approach would require
us to impose liability on all ten in that case.71 The key question remains the balancing of the liberty and security interests of the parties, and increasing the
number of parties does not change the fact that the conduct of the defendants
has resulted in an injury to the plaintiff of exactly the type that the duty of care
was meant to prevent. Refusing to hold all defendants liable in such a case would
fail to adequately protect the very interests that the norms of reciprocal conduct
were put in place to protect.
Second, our argument also resolves cases where one potential cause of the
plaintiff's injury was non-tortious.72 If it turns out that Mickey was not careless
in shooting his gun, but that Jerry was, and that Bob was hit by exactly one pellet, although it cannot be determined who shot the pellet, then it becomes less
clear that considerations of reciprocity lead to the conclusion that liability
the remedial right argument was noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Joseph Brant
MemorialHospital v. Koziol, [19781 1 S.C.R. 491 at 501. The Court rejected the lower
court's holding that held liable a defendant whose negligence made it impossible to establish
the cause of the plaintiffs injury-a holding that seemed to rely on Rand J.'s remedial right
argument in exactly the problematic way suggested by Hart & HonorS.
70.

See Cook, supra note 9; Porat & Stein, ibid.
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Whether the liability thereby imposed would require joint liability for all defendants to all
plaintiffs is another question. An argument can be made that the liability ought to be joint,
on the grounds that the norm of reciprocal conduct that is violated is the same regardless of
the defendant's economic or market position. But this conclusion is controversial, and,
indeed, it is rejected by Ripstein and Zipursky. See supra note 23 at 239-40.

72.

See Fairchild,supra note 11. See also Barker,supra note 2.
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ought to be imposed on both Mickey and Jerry. The reason for this takes us
back to the idea that rights survive wrongs. If Mickey was not careless in shooting his gun, then there is a good chance that Bob's injury was not something
that Bob had a right to be free from, but was merely something that happened
to him. Consequently, in such a case, it seems to us to be entirely appropriate for
Mickey to argue that, because Bob cannot prove on the balance of probabilities
that he (Mickey) fired the pellet that injured Bob, imposing liability on him
would unfairly limit his interest in freedom and would unduly favour Bob's
interest in security. At the very least, such an argument is not precluded by anything we say here. 3

VII.CONCLUSION
Our goal in this article has been to make plausible the idea that there exist certain
normative principles underlying negligence law that explain both why factual
causation is required in typical cases, as well as why its abandonment in atypical
cases is defensible, and that also make plausible the idea that a principled distinction between the two types of cases can be drawn. Our argument has rested
on a conception of negligence law that asks, first and foremost, whether a given
plaintiff had a right against a particular defendant to be free from certain forms
of interference. On the account articulated here, such rights of non-interference
are derived from underlying norms of reciprocal conduct, and are intimately
linked to associated norms of liability or repair. The requirement of factual causation is, in typical cases, a manifestation of these underlying norms: the plaintiff has a right to be free from injury caused by the defendant's carelessness.
This is part of what it means for the plaintiffs injury to be linked to a wrong
suffered at the defendant's hand. We have argued, however, that abandoning
the requirement of factual causation in atypical cases also manifests negligence
law's underlying normative structure. In cases of causal indeterminacy, such as
Desert Trek, Car Crash, and Lightning, the inquiry focuses on the plaintiffs
right against a given defendant to be free from certain forms of interference.
Consequently, the fact that the plaintiff suffers a further harm at the hands of
another defendant in no way negates the status of the plaintiffs prior right
against the first defendant. To hold otherwise would be to allow the first defendant to benefit from the wrongdoing of another.
73.

See also Kingston v. Chicago andN. W Ry., 211 N.W. 913 (Wisc. Sup. Ct. 1927).
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Similarly, in cases of historical uncertainty, exemplified by Hunters, the
focus remains on the plaintiff's right to be free from certain interferences. Our
claim is that, in these admittedly difficult cases, fair terms of interaction between the parties are better preserved if liability is imposed on defendants, notwithstanding the fact that factual causation cannot be established using the
traditional but-for test. Doing so is consistent with underlying principles of
fairness because it does not restrict the defendants' liberty interests any more
than they are already limited by the duty of care to which they are subject. The
explanation here parallels the one given above in connection with cases of causal
indeterminacy: to refuse to impose liability on defendants in cases like Hunters
would enable each defendant to benefit from the wrongdoing of the other(s),
thereby violating the associated norms of conduct.
There is much more that could be said about this, and related, problems.
For instance, we have said nothing about the so-called material contribution
test for factual causation. 7 We have also remained silent about the controversy
surrounding what has become known as the loss of chance doctrine. 5 Those are
important topics to be sure. However, while related to the problem of factual
uncertainty, these topics are, in our View, distinct from it, and, so, lie beyond
the scope of this article.
The approach to the problem of factual uncertainty argued for in this article agrees in many respects with the approach of Ripstein and Zipursky, who
remark that "it is only when we understand how the concepts of tort law are
structured that we can evaluate its capacity to serve our favoured goals, and we
can decide how, in a changing world, these concepts are to be given content."76
Our proposal suggests that the content given to the concepts and principles of
tort law can be manifested differently in different situations. Our approach is
also in broad agreement with recent jurisprudence on the nature of, and the
role played by, factual causation in the negligence inquiry. As the Supreme
Court of Canada stated in Resurfice, the requirement of factual causation can be
abandoned in certain types of cases, provided that two requirements are met:
First, it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's negligence
caused the plaintiffs injury using the "but for" test. The impossibility must be due to

74. See material contribution cases, supra note 17.
75. See Gregg v. Scott, [2005] 2 A.C. 176 (H.L.).
76. Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 23 at 246.
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factors that are outside of the plaintiffs control; for example, current limits of scientific knowledge. Second, it must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care
owed to the plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury,
and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of injury. In other words, the plaintiffs injury must fall within the ambit of the risk created by the defendant's breach.
In those exceptional cases where these two requirements are satisfied, liability may be
imposed, even though the "but for" test is not satisfied, because it would offend basic
notions of fairness and justice to deny liability by applying a "but for" approach."
The argument of this article can be seen as providing one explanation and
justification for this decision, and also for other recent decisions reaching similar results.7 ' The idea motivating these decisions is that, in atypical cases, liability may be imposed on a defendant, notwithstanding the plaintiffs inability to
prove factual causation. In our view, the justification for such an approach can
be seen to derive from reflection on the basic normative concepts and principles
that underlie negligence liability quite generally. As a result, approaches to the
problem of factual uncertainty that appeal to such normative concepts and
principles to make sense of atypical cases are in no way inconsistent with the
nature and structure of negligence law. Indeed, the opposite is true: in taking
negligence law seriously as law, such approaches are instead reflective and supportive of it.

77.

Resurfice, supra note 5 at para. 25.
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See e.g. Fairchild,supra note 11.

